Africa boasts abundant renewable energy resources, including sunlight, wind, hydro, and geothermal potential. These resources can play a vital role in both Africa’s sustainable development and the global transition to a low-carbon future. However, financial constraints and underinvestment have prevented many African countries from fully harnessing their renewable energy potential. African countries’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) between 2020 and 2030 demand an estimated US$2.8 trillion, surpassing 93% of Africa’s collective GDP. Despite governments pledging roughly 10% of this sum, there remains a significant funding gap, particularly in sectors like energy and transport. Chinese investors can bridge this gap by providing crucial funding, technology, and expertise to help African nations maximise their renewable energy potential.  

The Renewable Energy Briefing, titled “Green Horizons in 2024: Exploring Africa’s Renewable Energy Potential for Chinese Investors” has identified Zambia, Mozambique, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, and Uganda as the top five priority investment destinations for Chinese investors in Africa. It provides a data-driven analysis of each country’s renewable energy potential, regulatory landscape, existing infrastructure, and investment opportunities. Additionally, the briefing highlights the crucial role that Chinese companies can play in Africa’s renewable energy transition and will offer strategic recommendations for further investment.  

The selection of the top five countries was based on seven key criteria, including Total Climate Finance (TCF), Electricity Access (EA), Chinese Foreign Direct Investments (CFDI), Renewable Energy Capacity (2022), Deployment of Policies (DOP), Percentage of Renewable Energy Source (RES) in Total Electricity Generated, and Renewable Energy Potential (REP). These criteria were divided into two categories: those showcasing a need for investment and those highlighting potential, opportunities, capacity, and strong relationship with China.  

 Identified top five priority investment destinations 

The Renewable Energy Briefing aims to equip Chinese investors with the essential insights needed to navigate the renewable energy markets of these top-tier destinations successfully. By providing detailed and tailored investor briefings for each country, Development Reimagined is ensuring that Chinese investors have the information they need to make well-informed and successful investments in Africa’s green energy sector. 

For the next step, DR is planning to organise an investment tour in some of  the identified countries in September 2024. The tour will aim not only to visit the sites for potential investment opportunities but also to stir dialogue and brainstorm practical partnerships with African business leaders and government officials to deliver on renewable energy. 

Unlocking Renewable Energy Potential in Africa (2024): Who are Africa’s top 5 destinations for Chinese renewable investment? Find our briefs below.

Get access to our Introduction and Methodology here

Our Angola investment brief here

Our DRC investment brief here

Our Mozambique investment brief here

Our Uganda investment brief here

Our Zambia investment brief here

For more information about the Renewable Energy Briefing, please contact Climate Program Manager Ms. Yike FU at yikefu@developmentreimagined.com .  

29th February, 2024  

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Recognising this need, the Climate Action Tracker was conceived to provide a more nuanced and bespoke overview of Chinese climate action in Africa. It aims to: 

• Identify various project types, such as investments, constructions, equipment supply, and aid projects. 
• Set out distribution across countries and sectors in more detail. 
• Classify FOCAC commitments regarding completed projects or announcements of new projects. 
• Inform future FOCAC 9 discussions and prioritize countries and stakeholders for engagements. 

Tracker Overview  

The Climate Action Tracker is an Excel-based, searchable database covering China’s climate-related projects in African countries. The time range spans from November 2021, with regular updates leading up to FOCAC 9 in 2024. 

We define climate actions as all the business engagements from Chinese stakeholders to address and respond to climate changes in Africa, and the identified sectors are Renewable Energy, Clean Technology, Clean Transportation, and Climate-friendly Infrastructure.  

Major tracking sources include official press releases from stakeholders, industry websites (e.g., Belt and Road Project Portal, China International Contractors Association), and leading media outlets and databases globally. 

Apart from the projects deals already signed or under pipeline, there are also active engagements between Chinese and African stakeholders, which reveal a more promising future for the long term, which has also been tracked separately as “Climate Exchanges” 

Climate Actions in the Past 2 Years 

As of November 24, 2023, the Climate Action Tracker has identified 95 climate projects in Africa with Chinese participation. The data reflects clear evidence of acceleration, with ten projects in 2022 and a remarkable 85 projects in 2023.

What’s the Climate Projects About?  

• Renewable energy projects account for over half of the projects (55.32%), with climate-friendly infrastructure leading at 24.47%. 

• 27 projects have been completed, with others in the contract signing or construction phase. 

• 32 African countries are involved, with Western Africa, South Africa, and East Africa dominating. 
• Top destination countries include Nigeria (14), Kenya (8), and the DRC. 

The Role of Chinese Stakeholders  

• 75 out of 95 projects are delivered by EPCs. 
• 11 projects are financed by Chinese stakeholders, including development bank finance, enterprise investments, and government aid. 
• 6 involve equipment supply deals or donations, while 3 are technology transfer projects. 

Who Financed those Projects?  

Finance details are available for 66 out of 95 cases, revealing diverse funding sources. 

• 23 solely funded by Chinese entities. 
• 15 funded by African entities. 
• 19 involve contributions from multiple parties, including those that are co-invested by Chinese, African, and other development partners. 

“Climate Exchanges”: Unveiling the Next Steps of Climate Cooperation 

Beyond signed or pipeline deals, the data also highlights actively ongoing engagements between China and African stakeholders, indicating a promising future. High-level conferences or visits have predominantly facilitated agreements and MOUs, while there’s a rising trend in capacity building, both delivered by the Chinese public and private sectors. 

We invite you to explore the Climate Action Tracker, a tool that promises to enhance your insights into Chinese climate business engagements in Africa. This database offers a unique and detailed perspective, serving as an essential resource for stakeholders like yourself.   

Please fill out this short form to receive access to our Climate Action Tracker.  

Feel free to reach out if you have any questions or if you’d like further assistance in navigating the tracker: yikefu@developmentreimagined.com

February 5th 2024

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This first dialogue, ‘Collaboration vs Competition- How can African organisations get the most out of local partnerships?’  explored how African led and/or African-owned organisations – from think tanks to Civil Society Organisations (CSO), private sector organisations (incl. consultancies) and even banks – can work together to build on shared strengths, avoid competition and best advance decolonisation in development. Ultimately working towards ensuring fast tracked progress on the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2063 on the continent.

Most African organisations are working towards localising development and fostering African leadership, emphasising the significant potential for more impactful outcomes through collaboration. However, localisation models have been about local and grassroots organisations working in collaboration with international development agencies and donors. The agency and African ownership this creates is limited and can in turn replicate unfavourable power dynamics within the system.

One of the key messages from the dialogue was that creating strong ecosystems and building up networks can play a significant role in transforming how African organisations partner.

The dialogue outlined practical steps for local organisations to achieve collective success in their development initiatives. It also considered the crucial roles that African governments, and the private sector can play in supporting these collaborative efforts.

Download the summary report/write-up (ENGLISH) here

If you wish to engage in further conversations or be included in our mailing list clients@developmentreimagined.com Your involvement is vital as we collectively drive transformative change in the development landscape.

5^th of December 2023

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FULL SPEECH BELOW

Thank you very much Vice President Yu Zirong, distinguished guests, and colleagues in the international development community, good morning!

Firstly, I would like to extend our heartfelt gratitude to the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC) for extending this gracious invitation to Development Reimagined to join this thematic session.

For Development Reimagined, as an African-led, independent international development consultancy, working on cutting-edge development issues, especially in China-Africa cooperation, it is great to see that as a major creditor in Africa, attention has been raised from China to look at different options in debt reorganisation, including debt-for-development swaps that we are discussing today and I would like to share an African perspective on exploring the potential of this instrument.

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic to the present, there has been an abundance of headlines about how the ability of African countries to service debts has been undermined and that there is a mounting debt crisis in Africa. Such narratives leave the false impression that African countries have been spending loans badly and neglected their imperative to access financing to fill their infrastructure and other spending gaps. We’ve also seen the limited effectiveness of previous instruments, for example, the G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) and then the Common Framework, as already mentioned by Mr Zhou Xuwen.

Our research on development finance has argued that the International Finance System (IFS) needs to be reimagined and redesigned to centre borrowers, providing significantly more fair and concessional finance, especially for low-income countries to fund their growth and achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Also, to put it simply – for African countries, fast, unconditional debt relief alongside fast access to new concessional finance is what they are in dire need of when seeking debt relief. Therefore, when we are making new proposals to innovate the debt system, if we are not just thinking about how easy or plausible it is for creditors and really taking the borrowers and their long-term development into account, these proposals need to be assessed against these criteria. 

Under such context, the question of what makes debt-for-development swaps a good alternative for China and its African debtors – is clear.

The African debtors may be able to access more flexible financial arrangements with China and can negotiate on the concessional terms, the design of specific development programs, and possibly the use of other supplemental financing instruments. We know that under the presence of constant and sometimes uncertain obligations to make debt repayments, these African governments were prevented from further investing in critical sectors like climate, health and education, the debt swap targeted at these sectors resolved their budget shortfalls. It represents a positive sign of moving away from the traps in the existing deadlocks with debt restructuring and a driving force to continue the progress with SDG commitments that are otherwise often underfunded.

For China, an option aligns with the commitment to support Africa on the governance of debt and other issues such as climate, health, and education, for which the debt-for-development swaps are best known and also included in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Dakar Action Plan. It helps refute the speculative criticisms around the “debt trap” narrative.

In addition, members of the Paris Club are only allowed to consent to debt swaps if the “IMF positively assesses that the debtor country’s debt restructuring program helps stabilize international trade relations,” and this rule has made it difficult for the Paris Club countries to engage in debt swaps with their borrowers. As a non-Paris Club major lender, China and African borrowers would not be constrained by such rules and could take the initiative in formulating creative solutions. By taking it to the next level, China and Africa together can have the capacity to leverage more international finance institutions to follow the lead.

Despite these benefits, there are also several drawbacks that we need to be aware of:

As the presentation by Ms Sun Tianshu already raised – The amount subjected to debt-for-development swaps is often too small to reduce the debt burden or improve the creditworthiness. For example, a 2021 debt-for-nature swap in Belize offered it debt relief worth 12 per cent of its GDP, but this was only a small dent in the 125 per cent that its total debt amounted to at the time. The lack of large-scale debt-for-development swaps also makes the ability to have a sustained impact on the recipient questionable.

Another fundamental disadvantage of debt swaps is that the additional fiscal space created from debt relief will usually materialize within an extended period of time (ranging from several years to even decades). On the contrary, debt service payments can be due much earlier. Put differently, in many instances, there is not enough time for a borrower to increase its fiscal spending in core sectors (such as education and health) since its ongoing debt service commitments may result in a myopic (or shortsighted) treatment of the additional fiscal space created. This comes to the issue of how to maintain a balance between repaying debts and investing in sustainable development projects.

Furthermore, the issue of fungibility on behalf of the debtors often leads creditor countries to exercise strict control over how funds from debt swaps are allocated and used by the recipient country. Previous practices, especially those led by Global North countries, tend to be further complicated with the conditionalities in terms of how funds generated from the debt swaps should be spent.

Lastly, as we are all aware of, and why we are making this pioneering discussion here today, the limited application and lack of experience add to the administrative costs compared to simple debt cancellation, and additional challenges in project selection and implementation, as well as robust monitoring mechanisms to ensure the accountability and transparency.

The debt-for-development swap, as an option, awaits further policy guidance and implementation. There is certainly a great deal of work to do and hereby, we make several recommendations for China and the African partners to explore the potential:

Firstly, even if the amount is relatively small, they are still meaningful financing if it can be strategically channeled into programs that are designed to generate long-term productivity and address issues of economic vulnerability. I would also like to point out that while at the current stage, debt-for-development swaps are best known for their application in sectors like environment, health, and education, the scope could also be expanded, for instance, into agriculture. Just to give a quick example – the 3rd phase of the $100 million debt swap program between Egypt and Italy includes include the establishment of Field Silos and Information Technology System for a Wheat Management project. 

When it comes to sovereignty concerns as well as the on-ground implementation, several African institutions can serve as ideal third parties for China and African borrowers to manage and advise on the effective use of debt swaps, providing expertise, oversight, and guidance to ensure that the swaps align with the developmental goals of the participating countries. These partners include the African Development Bank (AfDB), the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP) and regional economic communities. It is also critical for African countries to exercise agency and be the promoters themselves to propose development programs suitable for debt swaps and with specific guidelines provided to the Chinese counterparts.

A common practice is for the debtor to transfer the equivalent in local currency of debt cancelled to an established international trust fund, such as to support the projects in the debtor country. There are previous cases of sector-targeted funds between AfDB and other partners, like the Health in Africa Fund, and Africa Climate Change Fund; which is also why I raised the role African DF institutions can play. Back in 2014, the PBoC and AfDB established the co-financed Africa Growing Together Fund to sponsor projects over the next ten years. We recommend the replenishment of that fund is worth considering if we are looking for channels to utilize the debt-for-development swaps, especially since there is already a certain level of inter-ministerial coordination in place to facilitate the process.

Considered from a borrowers’ perspective, since debt swaps have been typically negotiated on a bilateral basis, and individual borrowers do not possess significant bargaining power. There is the opportunity to consider multilateral debt swaps for a targeted development sector that is a shared priority by several countries. Arguably more complex negotiations and transaction costs at the beginning, but in the long-term a multilateral mechanism mitigates the risks for the creditor and contributes to consistency and better coordination, as well as additional fund sources to support cross-border and regional projects.

I would also like to mention that since debt cancellation applies only to countries in severe debt crises, and the amount of debt-for-development swaps is small, China could consider extending the eligibility of debt swaps to include borrowers experiencing less severe debt stress, in exchange for commitments such as in nature-positive investment, which aligned with the FOCAC commitments to step up support in those sectors – Egypt could be a good case.

In response to the question of is debt-for-development swaps a silver bullet? We are aware that it does not address the root causes of debt distress, and we need to bear in mind that it’s a stand-alone approach; more systematic reform is needed in the debt system, as well as supplement with other instruments in the policy, such as a rethinking of the debt sustainability assessment facilitating the reallocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).

With all that being said, when the incentives to promote and the mechanism to implement are well-understood and well-designed, the debt-for-development swaps are a valuable and viable instrument that with suggested modifications come from diverse stakeholders based on previous experiences, can simultaneously contribute to the relief of debt distress, while supporting the long-term social and economic development in Africa.

As for China, by embracing this new solution, can demonstrate commitment and leadership in addressing the interlinked challenges of debt and the lack of progress in achieving SDGs, thereby contributing to a more resilient post-pandemic recovery for Africa and for the Global South as a whole.

For Development Reimagined, we are looking forward to supporting with an understanding of the debt situation in Africa and facilitating the negotiations and designing of governance architecture for debt-for-development swap as a new instrument.

Thank you very much!

December 2023

The post Speech: Empowering Africa through Debt-for-Development Swaps in China-Africa Collaboration appeared first on Development Reimagined.

However, according to the data released in 2023 by Global Energy Monitor, current operating capacity of large utility-scale solar power in Africa is only 9478 megawatts (or, 9.4 gigawatts). This is only 1.7% of the global deployment of solar capacity. In comparison, for instance, China – a third the size of Africa, has close to 400GW of solar capacity, and Japan, 100 times smaller than Africa, has close to 80GW capacity. The UK – a little smaller than Japan – has 15GW capacity of solar, still more than the entire African continent.

In contrast, Africa as a continent – and indeed, most African countries – have a greater PV practical potential (4.51 kWh/kWp/day) than China (3.88 kWh/kWp/day), Japan, the UK, and the Global average (4.19 kWh/kWp/day).

Therefore, Africa is – in principle – the best frontier to develop more solar power energy.

So what is holding back solar from being deployed on the continent faster than in other regions? A lack of Finance? Africa Risk premiums? Our view, is it’s a combination of all.  And if the disparity is not addressed – for example through significant support to African countries to deploy the renewables targets – the new global target may serve to exacerbate the existing disparities.

Our infographic takes a closer look at the solar power landscape across diverse African countries and regions, showcasing the potential of solar power on the continent and illustrating the pivotal role of this source of clean energy in the global agenda.

Which parts of Africa exhibit the highest potential for solar power, and which countries on the continent are poised to experience more advancements in solar power capacity? Our data-driven infographic below answers these questions and more.

Average practical potential: Concerning the long-term photovoltaic power output, Northern and Southern African region have the greatest practical potential, while Central Africa ranks last. Namibia, Egypt, Lesotho, Libya, and Botswana are the top five countries in terms of average practical potential.

The operating solar farms: Northern Africa and Southern Africa have a clear lead in the operation of solar farm capacity. South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Senegal are the top five countries concerning operating solar farm capacity.

The prospective capacity of solar farms: In terms of generation capacity, Northern Africa and Southern Africa are still top ranked. Egypt, Morocco, South Africa, Tunisia, and Algeria are the five countries with the largest improvement in solar farm capacity.

Check out the infographic below for more findings.

To find out how Development Reimagined can support you, your organisation, or Government, please email the team at clients@developmentreimagined.com.

Special thanks go to Lingqi Deng, Yunong Wu, Yike Fu for their work on the graphics and for collecting/analysing the underlying data and this accompanying article.

The data was collated primarily from a range of sources, including the Global Energy Monitor and World Bank data.

If you spot any gaps or have any enquiries, please send your feedback to us at media@developmentreimagined.com, and we will aim to respond ASAP.

December 2023

The post Infographic: Africa’s Huge Solar Power Potential appeared first on Development Reimagined.

Your Excellency Mr. Zhongdong Tang of the Department of African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China;

Your Excellency Mr. Martin Chedondo, Ambassador for the Republic of Zimbabwe to China; Your Excellency Mr. Lahcene Kaid Slimane, Ambassador of People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria to China

Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

As an African woman who works from three continents where my firm, Development Reimagined, is based, I am delighted to virtually join you to present my thoughts, reflections, and possibly recommendations on health cooperation, especially with African countries.

Let me express my particular gratitude for the efforts of the team at the China National Health Development Research Center and for their kind invitation. Their commitment to the theme, “Deepening High-Quality Health Development Cooperation to Build a Global Community of Health for All”, sets the stage for our discussions today.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let’s begin with a vision – a world where health cooperation in African countries is not just about trying to save lives today, but about building African capacities to save lives tomorrow

and every day into the future. A world in which health cooperation has what is known in English as an “exit strategy” – a plan to not exist.

This vision, in fact, has been a reality in countries like China and India.

In the late 1970s, China began to accept aid from bilateral donors and multilateral organisations. Official statistics suggest that over the 22 year period from 1979 to 2001, China received just under US$40 billion worth of international aid from multilateral and bilateral sources, with Germany and Japan being the two largest bilateral donors. While this was small in comparison to China’s GDP and population, and it also accounted for just 4% of global aid flows over that same period, nevertheless, it supported China’s development path. Some of this, as well as aid after 2001, was for health challenges – for instance, China received over US$800 million in assistance from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria from 2003 to 2013, making it the Fund’s largest recipient over that period.

Yet, today, China is mostly health sufficient, able to deal with its own health challenges, extend health aid to other countries, and, in some cases, lead the way in global innovations for health.

Similarly, India, over the same period 1979-2001, received just over US$41 billion in aid, some of which was for health, and unlike China that reduced aid receipts significantly thereafter, continued to receive similar amounts of international aid from multilateral and bilateral sources over the next 20 years – around US$40 billion also. With this, and its own domestic actions, India has made significant strides in life expectancy, infant and under-five mortality rates, and disease incidence. Many diseases, such as polio, guinea worm disease, yaws, and tetanus, have been eradicated in India.

Same goes for China, which, for instance went from having 30 million malaria cases a year in 1949, to zero in 2021.

The question is how? The evidence suggests it is not international cooperation. If it were, the African continent, which has been the recipient of over US$350 million in aid from 1979-2001,

and over US$840 million in aid from 2002-2021, much larger figures than China or India, especially per capita, would be in an incredibly strong position today.

So, what is the difference? There are development experts out there who will blame bad governance or corruption as the main reason for Africa’s challenges. I take issue with this. Africans are humans just like all others. Corruption and good and bad governance exist everywhere.

No, what has been different when it comes to health are the degrees to which China and India, and others in a similar position, especially in Asia, have sought to, alongside receiving health aid, developed their own pharmaceutical industries, and managed aid carefully to ensure it boosts the country’s health sovereignty, and does not encourage or exacerbate dependence.

China was initially and remains a net-importer of pharmaceutical products, but its exports have grown extremely fast over the past two decades, with its exports valued at US$12.3 billion in 2020. Today, China does not only excel in innovation, research, and development, particularly in addressing domestic health issues, it has a global leadership position in the production and export of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs).

India, on the other hand, has steadily increased its trade surplus in pharmaceuticals – especially of generics – since the early 1990s, with a carefully calibrated intellectual property and pricing regulatory regime that prioritised domestic players and domestic health needs, reaching an export value of US$19.8 billion in the same year, with its imports only at US$2.87 billion, much lower than China at US$30 billion a year.

The two countries now represent the world’s 18th and 10th largest markets by export volumes, respectively – and have self-sufficiency for medicines.

In contrast, as a 2022 Development Reimagined report outlined, every single African country remains a net importer of pharmaceutical products, no matter the size of their domestic pharmaceutical industry, no matter how great their regulatory and business environment and intellectual property protection. Putting this differently, Africa represents only 3% of global drug production but imports over 80% of its consumed pharmaceutical goods. Or put another way – while the first colonial multinational pharmaceutical manufacturers were set up on the continent in the 1930s, and today there are an estimated 600-1000 pharmaceutical companies operating, 22 African countries have no local production of pharmaceuticals at all.

Part of this has been due to the impact of health aid. And let me just give one example to illustrate, but these issues applies to almost every single type of development cooperation.

For instance, pooled global procurement of medicines can crowd out local manufacturing, especially at early stages before scale-up, where production costs are necessarily high, before efficiencies set in. Without active management, global procurement can reinforce established vaccine supply chains, which are heavily skewed to non-African producers. We have seen this with COVID-19. Of the almost 2 billion doses supplied by the WHO’s COVAX during the COVID- 19 pandemic, none were obtained from African manufacturers.

Thus, the global funds can end up harming health sovereignty in Africa rather than building it, and can be seen as being inconsistent with African development plans.

There are similar issues that apply to every type of health aid – from health strengthening work, to health workers and medical aid schemes, even to hospital and other medical equipment building.

This is why today, there is a renewed political ambition in Africa for ownership and sovereignty

– for instance to enhance local production of medicines, vaccines, and health commodities, emphasizing the importance of scaling up quality manufacturing closer to consumers, and learning from the experience of countries such as China and India in managing health aid actively, carefully to build health sovereignty rather than erode it.

This sets the stage for collaboration between Chinese and African stakeholders, presenting substantial opportunities.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The African continent needs innovation in health cooperation; we need innovation in health financing; we need innovation in healthcare delivery to build a resilient and sustainable healthcare system for the future. And there is an opportunity for China to be at the centre of this, in three ways.

First, China has the opportunity to directly support Africa’s pharmaceutical sector to grow by finding ways to push more foreign direct investment into the continent. Africa is actively working on enhancing its vaccine production capabilities, with countries like Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Rwanda, and Senegal leading efforts. Private sector investment can be a crucial driver for economic growth and development, and local production capacity for African medicines, can be focused on replacing Africa’s import volumes of health commodities reaching US$21.8 billion in 2021 globally.

And China is well placed.

For instance, of the total bilateral supply of COVID19 vaccines to Africa, our data suggests that China accounted for 75% of donated doses and 61% of delivered doses to African nations. Africa also has abundant raw materials, such as palm oil, latex, and cotton, for the production of essential medical devices and health commodities. With Africa’s growing population, tailoring these to address prevalent diseases, such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, cholera, even monkeypox and other diseases less prevalent in wealthy countries, will be an excellent place to start, especially if Chinese manufacturing firms make local partnerships to bring costs down, and emphasize the importance of indigenous research and development in the pharmaceutical and medical device sectors, with a specific focus on integrating Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) and Traditional African Medicine (TAM) practices. This will advantage local medicines.

And, with more efficiency and infrastructure, especially in pharmaceutical parks which already exist and continued to be established in key hubs on the continent, it will also be plausible to position manufacturing on the continent for export to global markets, including back to China,

especially if Africa is able to negotiate for more preferential trading schemes with various countries.

Supporting Africa’s health needs by directing private sector finance to invest in local manufacturing – not just sending and distributing health products – is something we have hardly seen other donors do. It is well overdue.

Second, China can support – with grant-based aid funds – comprehensive capacity-building programs tailored to the specific needs of African nations. This can build on China’s existing collaboration with Africa’s own central health institution the Africa Center for Disease Control (Africa CDC), and can include initiatives to enhance the skills and expertise of local professionals in manufacturing, quality control, and regulatory compliance. Collaboration with the new African Medicines Agency (AMA) will help to ensure that capacity-building efforts are aligned with the latest medical practices and standards – standards that are diverse, reflect African needs at the stage of its development not just global multinationals needs for IP protection, and also reflect Africa’s own medical remedies. By helping to build a skilled local workforce in collaboration with Africa’s own medical associations, China can work to support African countries to develop a robust foundation for health sovereignty.

Again, while we have seen many partners including China send medical teams to Africa, or build hospitals, we have hardly seen partners bolster the African institutions that plan to do this, in a big way. At best, the support is ad hoc and small. Yet again, it is well overdue.

Third, and last but not least, China can support innovation in health cooperation to have an “exit strategy” by actively listening to and advocating African positions globally when it comes to health needs. For example, African Heads of State in 2022 agreed a position that all global procurement agencies such as GAVI, UNICEF and others should aim to source at least 30 per cent of all their vaccines from Africa. Similarly, African countries urgently need the WHO to be faster in approving more types or brands of the Oral Cholera Vaccine to improve global supply.

Seeking to understand and support African positions on the global health sector will be incredibly useful for China going forwards – and again, hardly practiced in international cooperation so far.

Ladies and Gentlemen, in conclusion, the road to a thriving health sector in Africa may have its challenges, but the lessons from China and other emerging economies illuminate the path forward. An exit strategy, with local manufacturing, local knowledge and African leadership at its core.

Let us embark on this vision for an exit strategy with optimism, resilience. Only through true health sovereignty everywhere will we build a brighter future for our communities and the generations to come.

Xie Xie!

December 2023

The post Speech: How Can China Support African Health Sovereignty through Innovative Finance? appeared first on Development Reimagined.

With a growing population and increasing energy demands, Africa now stands at a critical, urgent juncture to harness its abundant wind resources, aligning with the global commitment to transition towards clean and green energy.

Why? The current operating capacity of operating wind farms in Africa is approximately 9 GW, only 1% of the global total. Comparatively, China – a third the size of Africa – has nearly 342 GW capacity of wind power, almost 40 times that of Africa. The UK – approximately 125 times smaller in land-mass than Africa – has close to 27 GW of wind capacity, three times of that of Africa. Japan is roughly 80 times smaller than Africa, while its capacity is 4.4 GW, around half of that in Africa.

So what is causing Africa’s current underutilization of its abundant wind resources and its underperformance compared to other regions? We believe that challenges such as a constrained global financial architecture and over-elevated risk premiums are the main reason for slow progress in African countries, making it difficult to scale up wind projects. Without comprehensive solutions, the existing disparities may be exacerbated. Therefore, additional support for Africa to bridge the financing gap and mitigate Africa risk premiums are essential for the continent to actively contribute to global renewable energy agenda and climate action goals, such as the COP28’s Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge.

Where to start off this investment? Our infographic delves into the promising landscape of wind power across various African regions and countries, shedding light on the immense possibilities for sustainable energy solutions, and displaying the diverse levels of potential wind power capacity among African countries. For instance:

Strong wind sources: We found that Eastern Africa and Northern Africa are endowed with more wind power potential than other African regions. Chad, Lesotho, Djibouti, Cape Verde, and Morocco are the top five countries in terms of wind sources.

Current operational wind farms: Southern Africa and Northern Africa have greater capacity, while as of January 2023, the Central African region does not have any eligible operating wind farms.

Best Prospective wind farm capacity: Northern Africa has the largest prospective capacity, while Central Africa remains at the bottom of the ranking. Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, South Africa and Namibia are the top five countries in terms of expected improvement in wind farm capacity.

Check out the infographic Africa’s amazing wind power potential below to learn more.

To find out how Development Reimagined can support you, your organisation, or Government, please email the team at clients@developmentreimagined.com.

Special thanks go to Lingqi Deng, Yunong Wu, and Yike Fu for their work on the graphics and for collecting/analysing the underlying data and this accompanying article.

The data was collated primarily from a range of sources, including the Global Energy Monitor and World Bank data.

If you spot any gaps or have any enquiries, please send your feedback to us at media@developmentreimagined.com, and we will aim to respond ASAP.

December 2023

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At Development Reimagined, we first proposed the idea of a Borrowers Club in 2020, and have been working on making the concept a reality since then, speaking and writing extensively about its importance for debtor countries in the current creditor-centric financial system and the power it holds in providing critical financing to countries when they need it the most. We are therefore very pleased to see this development.

As a Borrowers Club, this is a historic moment and major victory not only for the OSC but for all borrower countries as it marks the first official establishment of a club that centers borrowers’ needs, interests, and priorities. 

As the OSC continues to expand and add new members, Ministers of Finance and the Secretary-General called on all countries in the Global South to seek membership in the CLUB and invited international organizations and initiatives to work together closely with the CLUB.

In the Joint Statement, Ministers of Finance called on creditors to work alongside debtors to ensure an international financial system that accurately represents the interests of countries in the Global South. The Joint Statement also made it clear that the objective of the CLUB is to achieve authentic development through strategic investment in sectors that enhance sovereignty.

The first meeting of the Ministerial Committee of the CLUB is set for early 2024 to decide and operationalise the priority actions and coordinate further.   

To read the official joint statement of the Ministers of Finance, click here, and to read the press release, click here. 

December 2023

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The UNAIDS Report revealed that:

1. Seven African countries have achieved the 95-95-95 targets – that is, 95% of people living with HIV know their status, 95% of those aware of their status receive life-saving antiretroviral treatment, and 95% of those on treatment attain suppressed viral loads. These countries are Eswatini, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Sao Tome and Principe.
2. Eight other African countries are on their way to meeting these targets.

This is remarkable progress, given that HIV/AIDS had ravaged the continent and that data showed Africa had the highest number of infections in the early 2000s; it was also the leading cause of death in Africa. Progress has also been witnessed in the: – new HIV infections that fell by 37%, HIV-related deaths fell by 45%, and 13.6 million lives were saved due to Antiretroviral therapy (ART). There has also been significant progress in ART coverage, with considerable expansion between 2012 and 2022. The transmission cases were few in 2020 for two reasons: COVID-19 restricted movement but most importantly, ART coverage has greatly improved over the years.

Despite this progress, it is not the time to lower our guard – although again, we are not sounding the alarm!

The goal is to eradicate HIV/AIDS by the year 2030 under SDG 3 but this requires financing. Data reveals that funding for HIV/AIDS was significantly reduced in 2021. Data also shows that the funding was decreased due to countries’ little fiscal space during COVID-19 as finances were redirected to other sectors and the fight against the pandemic. Now, LMIC, including Africa, need US$ 29 billion per year to meet the SGD 3 goal of eradicating HIV/AIDS by the year 2030. Notably, fully financing the fight against HIV/AIDS will lead to a reduction of infections by 40-90% per year.

Local manufacturing has played a significant role in fighting HIV/AIDS in Africa. African countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe manufacture ART drugs locally. But data reveals that local production does not meet local needs.

So, what do we propose?

While HIV/AIDS funding for access to drugs is essential, we propose that external funding be directed to local manufacturing. External funders must work hand in hand with existing local manufacturers to help them grow rather than crowd them out, to contribute to Africa’s health sovereignty journey.

Two, funding should focus on prevention, in a bid to ensure funding does not stop. Prevention includes areas such as: – maternal health, pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) and post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP). Funding prevention will drastically reduce the number of new infections.

Again, we are not sounding the alarm; we are tracking progress, but this progress is not without shortcomings. So, on this World AIDS Day – as Africa continues with its ascent in the fight against HIV/AIDS – we propose funding be directed to local manufacturing and prevention.

Check out our infographic below to understand the data yourself!

To find out how Development Reimagined can support you, your organisation, or Government, please email the team at clients@developmentreimagined.com.

Special thanks go to Ivory Kairo and Rugare Mukaganga for their work on the graphics collecting/analysing the underlying data and this accompanying article.

The data was collated primarily from a range of sources, including the abovementioned UNAIDS report and World Bank data.

If you spot any gaps or have any enquiries, please send your feedback to us at media@developmentreimagined.com, and we will aim to respond ASAP.

December 2023

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