Africa boasts abundant renewable energy resources, including sunlight, wind, hydro, and geothermal potential. These resources can play a vital role in both Africa’s sustainable development and the global transition to a low-carbon future. However, financial constraints and underinvestment have prevented many African countries from fully harnessing their renewable energy potential. African countries’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) between 2020 and 2030 demand an estimated US$2.8 trillion, surpassing 93% of Africa’s collective GDP. Despite governments pledging roughly 10% of this sum, there remains a significant funding gap, particularly in sectors like energy and transport. Chinese investors can bridge this gap by providing crucial funding, technology, and expertise to help African nations maximise their renewable energy potential.  

The Renewable Energy Briefing, titled “Green Horizons in 2024: Exploring Africa’s Renewable Energy Potential for Chinese Investors” has identified Zambia, Mozambique, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, and Uganda as the top five priority investment destinations for Chinese investors in Africa. It provides a data-driven analysis of each country’s renewable energy potential, regulatory landscape, existing infrastructure, and investment opportunities. Additionally, the briefing highlights the crucial role that Chinese companies can play in Africa’s renewable energy transition and will offer strategic recommendations for further investment.  

The selection of the top five countries was based on seven key criteria, including Total Climate Finance (TCF), Electricity Access (EA), Chinese Foreign Direct Investments (CFDI), Renewable Energy Capacity (2022), Deployment of Policies (DOP), Percentage of Renewable Energy Source (RES) in Total Electricity Generated, and Renewable Energy Potential (REP). These criteria were divided into two categories: those showcasing a need for investment and those highlighting potential, opportunities, capacity, and strong relationship with China.  

 Identified top five priority investment destinations 

The Renewable Energy Briefing aims to equip Chinese investors with the essential insights needed to navigate the renewable energy markets of these top-tier destinations successfully. By providing detailed and tailored investor briefings for each country, Development Reimagined is ensuring that Chinese investors have the information they need to make well-informed and successful investments in Africa’s green energy sector. 

For the next step, DR is planning to organise an investment tour in some of  the identified countries in September 2024. The tour will aim not only to visit the sites for potential investment opportunities but also to stir dialogue and brainstorm practical partnerships with African business leaders and government officials to deliver on renewable energy. 

Unlocking Renewable Energy Potential in Africa (2024): Who are Africa’s top 5 destinations for Chinese renewable investment? Find our briefs below.

Get access to our Introduction and Methodology here

Our Angola investment brief here

Our DRC investment brief here

Our Mozambique investment brief here

Our Uganda investment brief here

Our Zambia investment brief here

For more information about the Renewable Energy Briefing, please contact Climate Program Manager Ms. Yike FU at yikefu@developmentreimagined.com .  

29th February, 2024  

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Recognising this need, the Climate Action Tracker was conceived to provide a more nuanced and bespoke overview of Chinese climate action in Africa. It aims to: 

• Identify various project types, such as investments, constructions, equipment supply, and aid projects. 
• Set out distribution across countries and sectors in more detail. 
• Classify FOCAC commitments regarding completed projects or announcements of new projects. 
• Inform future FOCAC 9 discussions and prioritize countries and stakeholders for engagements. 

Tracker Overview  

The Climate Action Tracker is an Excel-based, searchable database covering China’s climate-related projects in African countries. The time range spans from November 2021, with regular updates leading up to FOCAC 9 in 2024. 

We define climate actions as all the business engagements from Chinese stakeholders to address and respond to climate changes in Africa, and the identified sectors are Renewable Energy, Clean Technology, Clean Transportation, and Climate-friendly Infrastructure.  

Major tracking sources include official press releases from stakeholders, industry websites (e.g., Belt and Road Project Portal, China International Contractors Association), and leading media outlets and databases globally. 

Apart from the projects deals already signed or under pipeline, there are also active engagements between Chinese and African stakeholders, which reveal a more promising future for the long term, which has also been tracked separately as “Climate Exchanges” 

Climate Actions in the Past 2 Years 

As of November 24, 2023, the Climate Action Tracker has identified 95 climate projects in Africa with Chinese participation. The data reflects clear evidence of acceleration, with ten projects in 2022 and a remarkable 85 projects in 2023.

What’s the Climate Projects About?  

• Renewable energy projects account for over half of the projects (55.32%), with climate-friendly infrastructure leading at 24.47%. 

• 27 projects have been completed, with others in the contract signing or construction phase. 

• 32 African countries are involved, with Western Africa, South Africa, and East Africa dominating. 
• Top destination countries include Nigeria (14), Kenya (8), and the DRC. 

The Role of Chinese Stakeholders  

• 75 out of 95 projects are delivered by EPCs. 
• 11 projects are financed by Chinese stakeholders, including development bank finance, enterprise investments, and government aid. 
• 6 involve equipment supply deals or donations, while 3 are technology transfer projects. 

Who Financed those Projects?  

Finance details are available for 66 out of 95 cases, revealing diverse funding sources. 

• 23 solely funded by Chinese entities. 
• 15 funded by African entities. 
• 19 involve contributions from multiple parties, including those that are co-invested by Chinese, African, and other development partners. 

“Climate Exchanges”: Unveiling the Next Steps of Climate Cooperation 

Beyond signed or pipeline deals, the data also highlights actively ongoing engagements between China and African stakeholders, indicating a promising future. High-level conferences or visits have predominantly facilitated agreements and MOUs, while there’s a rising trend in capacity building, both delivered by the Chinese public and private sectors. 

We invite you to explore the Climate Action Tracker, a tool that promises to enhance your insights into Chinese climate business engagements in Africa. This database offers a unique and detailed perspective, serving as an essential resource for stakeholders like yourself.   

Please fill out this short form to receive access to our Climate Action Tracker.  

Feel free to reach out if you have any questions or if you’d like further assistance in navigating the tracker: yikefu@developmentreimagined.com

February 5th 2024

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FULL SPEECH BELOW

Thank you very much Vice President Yu Zirong, distinguished guests, and colleagues in the international development community, good morning!

Firstly, I would like to extend our heartfelt gratitude to the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC) for extending this gracious invitation to Development Reimagined to join this thematic session.

For Development Reimagined, as an African-led, independent international development consultancy, working on cutting-edge development issues, especially in China-Africa cooperation, it is great to see that as a major creditor in Africa, attention has been raised from China to look at different options in debt reorganisation, including debt-for-development swaps that we are discussing today and I would like to share an African perspective on exploring the potential of this instrument.

Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic to the present, there has been an abundance of headlines about how the ability of African countries to service debts has been undermined and that there is a mounting debt crisis in Africa. Such narratives leave the false impression that African countries have been spending loans badly and neglected their imperative to access financing to fill their infrastructure and other spending gaps. We’ve also seen the limited effectiveness of previous instruments, for example, the G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) and then the Common Framework, as already mentioned by Mr Zhou Xuwen.

Our research on development finance has argued that the International Finance System (IFS) needs to be reimagined and redesigned to centre borrowers, providing significantly more fair and concessional finance, especially for low-income countries to fund their growth and achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Also, to put it simply – for African countries, fast, unconditional debt relief alongside fast access to new concessional finance is what they are in dire need of when seeking debt relief. Therefore, when we are making new proposals to innovate the debt system, if we are not just thinking about how easy or plausible it is for creditors and really taking the borrowers and their long-term development into account, these proposals need to be assessed against these criteria. 

Under such context, the question of what makes debt-for-development swaps a good alternative for China and its African debtors – is clear.

The African debtors may be able to access more flexible financial arrangements with China and can negotiate on the concessional terms, the design of specific development programs, and possibly the use of other supplemental financing instruments. We know that under the presence of constant and sometimes uncertain obligations to make debt repayments, these African governments were prevented from further investing in critical sectors like climate, health and education, the debt swap targeted at these sectors resolved their budget shortfalls. It represents a positive sign of moving away from the traps in the existing deadlocks with debt restructuring and a driving force to continue the progress with SDG commitments that are otherwise often underfunded.

For China, an option aligns with the commitment to support Africa on the governance of debt and other issues such as climate, health, and education, for which the debt-for-development swaps are best known and also included in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Dakar Action Plan. It helps refute the speculative criticisms around the “debt trap” narrative.

In addition, members of the Paris Club are only allowed to consent to debt swaps if the “IMF positively assesses that the debtor country’s debt restructuring program helps stabilize international trade relations,” and this rule has made it difficult for the Paris Club countries to engage in debt swaps with their borrowers. As a non-Paris Club major lender, China and African borrowers would not be constrained by such rules and could take the initiative in formulating creative solutions. By taking it to the next level, China and Africa together can have the capacity to leverage more international finance institutions to follow the lead.

Despite these benefits, there are also several drawbacks that we need to be aware of:

As the presentation by Ms Sun Tianshu already raised – The amount subjected to debt-for-development swaps is often too small to reduce the debt burden or improve the creditworthiness. For example, a 2021 debt-for-nature swap in Belize offered it debt relief worth 12 per cent of its GDP, but this was only a small dent in the 125 per cent that its total debt amounted to at the time. The lack of large-scale debt-for-development swaps also makes the ability to have a sustained impact on the recipient questionable.

Another fundamental disadvantage of debt swaps is that the additional fiscal space created from debt relief will usually materialize within an extended period of time (ranging from several years to even decades). On the contrary, debt service payments can be due much earlier. Put differently, in many instances, there is not enough time for a borrower to increase its fiscal spending in core sectors (such as education and health) since its ongoing debt service commitments may result in a myopic (or shortsighted) treatment of the additional fiscal space created. This comes to the issue of how to maintain a balance between repaying debts and investing in sustainable development projects.

Furthermore, the issue of fungibility on behalf of the debtors often leads creditor countries to exercise strict control over how funds from debt swaps are allocated and used by the recipient country. Previous practices, especially those led by Global North countries, tend to be further complicated with the conditionalities in terms of how funds generated from the debt swaps should be spent.

Lastly, as we are all aware of, and why we are making this pioneering discussion here today, the limited application and lack of experience add to the administrative costs compared to simple debt cancellation, and additional challenges in project selection and implementation, as well as robust monitoring mechanisms to ensure the accountability and transparency.

The debt-for-development swap, as an option, awaits further policy guidance and implementation. There is certainly a great deal of work to do and hereby, we make several recommendations for China and the African partners to explore the potential:

Firstly, even if the amount is relatively small, they are still meaningful financing if it can be strategically channeled into programs that are designed to generate long-term productivity and address issues of economic vulnerability. I would also like to point out that while at the current stage, debt-for-development swaps are best known for their application in sectors like environment, health, and education, the scope could also be expanded, for instance, into agriculture. Just to give a quick example – the 3rd phase of the $100 million debt swap program between Egypt and Italy includes include the establishment of Field Silos and Information Technology System for a Wheat Management project. 

When it comes to sovereignty concerns as well as the on-ground implementation, several African institutions can serve as ideal third parties for China and African borrowers to manage and advise on the effective use of debt swaps, providing expertise, oversight, and guidance to ensure that the swaps align with the developmental goals of the participating countries. These partners include the African Development Bank (AfDB), the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP) and regional economic communities. It is also critical for African countries to exercise agency and be the promoters themselves to propose development programs suitable for debt swaps and with specific guidelines provided to the Chinese counterparts.

A common practice is for the debtor to transfer the equivalent in local currency of debt cancelled to an established international trust fund, such as to support the projects in the debtor country. There are previous cases of sector-targeted funds between AfDB and other partners, like the Health in Africa Fund, and Africa Climate Change Fund; which is also why I raised the role African DF institutions can play. Back in 2014, the PBoC and AfDB established the co-financed Africa Growing Together Fund to sponsor projects over the next ten years. We recommend the replenishment of that fund is worth considering if we are looking for channels to utilize the debt-for-development swaps, especially since there is already a certain level of inter-ministerial coordination in place to facilitate the process.

Considered from a borrowers’ perspective, since debt swaps have been typically negotiated on a bilateral basis, and individual borrowers do not possess significant bargaining power. There is the opportunity to consider multilateral debt swaps for a targeted development sector that is a shared priority by several countries. Arguably more complex negotiations and transaction costs at the beginning, but in the long-term a multilateral mechanism mitigates the risks for the creditor and contributes to consistency and better coordination, as well as additional fund sources to support cross-border and regional projects.

I would also like to mention that since debt cancellation applies only to countries in severe debt crises, and the amount of debt-for-development swaps is small, China could consider extending the eligibility of debt swaps to include borrowers experiencing less severe debt stress, in exchange for commitments such as in nature-positive investment, which aligned with the FOCAC commitments to step up support in those sectors – Egypt could be a good case.

In response to the question of is debt-for-development swaps a silver bullet? We are aware that it does not address the root causes of debt distress, and we need to bear in mind that it’s a stand-alone approach; more systematic reform is needed in the debt system, as well as supplement with other instruments in the policy, such as a rethinking of the debt sustainability assessment facilitating the reallocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).

With all that being said, when the incentives to promote and the mechanism to implement are well-understood and well-designed, the debt-for-development swaps are a valuable and viable instrument that with suggested modifications come from diverse stakeholders based on previous experiences, can simultaneously contribute to the relief of debt distress, while supporting the long-term social and economic development in Africa.

As for China, by embracing this new solution, can demonstrate commitment and leadership in addressing the interlinked challenges of debt and the lack of progress in achieving SDGs, thereby contributing to a more resilient post-pandemic recovery for Africa and for the Global South as a whole.

For Development Reimagined, we are looking forward to supporting with an understanding of the debt situation in Africa and facilitating the negotiations and designing of governance architecture for debt-for-development swap as a new instrument.

Thank you very much!

December 2023

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Your Excellency Mr. Zhongdong Tang of the Department of African Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China;

Your Excellency Mr. Martin Chedondo, Ambassador for the Republic of Zimbabwe to China; Your Excellency Mr. Lahcene Kaid Slimane, Ambassador of People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria to China

Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

As an African woman who works from three continents where my firm, Development Reimagined, is based, I am delighted to virtually join you to present my thoughts, reflections, and possibly recommendations on health cooperation, especially with African countries.

Let me express my particular gratitude for the efforts of the team at the China National Health Development Research Center and for their kind invitation. Their commitment to the theme, “Deepening High-Quality Health Development Cooperation to Build a Global Community of Health for All”, sets the stage for our discussions today.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let’s begin with a vision – a world where health cooperation in African countries is not just about trying to save lives today, but about building African capacities to save lives tomorrow

and every day into the future. A world in which health cooperation has what is known in English as an “exit strategy” – a plan to not exist.

This vision, in fact, has been a reality in countries like China and India.

In the late 1970s, China began to accept aid from bilateral donors and multilateral organisations. Official statistics suggest that over the 22 year period from 1979 to 2001, China received just under US$40 billion worth of international aid from multilateral and bilateral sources, with Germany and Japan being the two largest bilateral donors. While this was small in comparison to China’s GDP and population, and it also accounted for just 4% of global aid flows over that same period, nevertheless, it supported China’s development path. Some of this, as well as aid after 2001, was for health challenges – for instance, China received over US$800 million in assistance from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria from 2003 to 2013, making it the Fund’s largest recipient over that period.

Yet, today, China is mostly health sufficient, able to deal with its own health challenges, extend health aid to other countries, and, in some cases, lead the way in global innovations for health.

Similarly, India, over the same period 1979-2001, received just over US$41 billion in aid, some of which was for health, and unlike China that reduced aid receipts significantly thereafter, continued to receive similar amounts of international aid from multilateral and bilateral sources over the next 20 years – around US$40 billion also. With this, and its own domestic actions, India has made significant strides in life expectancy, infant and under-five mortality rates, and disease incidence. Many diseases, such as polio, guinea worm disease, yaws, and tetanus, have been eradicated in India.

Same goes for China, which, for instance went from having 30 million malaria cases a year in 1949, to zero in 2021.

The question is how? The evidence suggests it is not international cooperation. If it were, the African continent, which has been the recipient of over US$350 million in aid from 1979-2001,

and over US$840 million in aid from 2002-2021, much larger figures than China or India, especially per capita, would be in an incredibly strong position today.

So, what is the difference? There are development experts out there who will blame bad governance or corruption as the main reason for Africa’s challenges. I take issue with this. Africans are humans just like all others. Corruption and good and bad governance exist everywhere.

No, what has been different when it comes to health are the degrees to which China and India, and others in a similar position, especially in Asia, have sought to, alongside receiving health aid, developed their own pharmaceutical industries, and managed aid carefully to ensure it boosts the country’s health sovereignty, and does not encourage or exacerbate dependence.

China was initially and remains a net-importer of pharmaceutical products, but its exports have grown extremely fast over the past two decades, with its exports valued at US$12.3 billion in 2020. Today, China does not only excel in innovation, research, and development, particularly in addressing domestic health issues, it has a global leadership position in the production and export of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs).

India, on the other hand, has steadily increased its trade surplus in pharmaceuticals – especially of generics – since the early 1990s, with a carefully calibrated intellectual property and pricing regulatory regime that prioritised domestic players and domestic health needs, reaching an export value of US$19.8 billion in the same year, with its imports only at US$2.87 billion, much lower than China at US$30 billion a year.

The two countries now represent the world’s 18th and 10th largest markets by export volumes, respectively – and have self-sufficiency for medicines.

In contrast, as a 2022 Development Reimagined report outlined, every single African country remains a net importer of pharmaceutical products, no matter the size of their domestic pharmaceutical industry, no matter how great their regulatory and business environment and intellectual property protection. Putting this differently, Africa represents only 3% of global drug production but imports over 80% of its consumed pharmaceutical goods. Or put another way – while the first colonial multinational pharmaceutical manufacturers were set up on the continent in the 1930s, and today there are an estimated 600-1000 pharmaceutical companies operating, 22 African countries have no local production of pharmaceuticals at all.

Part of this has been due to the impact of health aid. And let me just give one example to illustrate, but these issues applies to almost every single type of development cooperation.

For instance, pooled global procurement of medicines can crowd out local manufacturing, especially at early stages before scale-up, where production costs are necessarily high, before efficiencies set in. Without active management, global procurement can reinforce established vaccine supply chains, which are heavily skewed to non-African producers. We have seen this with COVID-19. Of the almost 2 billion doses supplied by the WHO’s COVAX during the COVID- 19 pandemic, none were obtained from African manufacturers.

Thus, the global funds can end up harming health sovereignty in Africa rather than building it, and can be seen as being inconsistent with African development plans.

There are similar issues that apply to every type of health aid – from health strengthening work, to health workers and medical aid schemes, even to hospital and other medical equipment building.

This is why today, there is a renewed political ambition in Africa for ownership and sovereignty

– for instance to enhance local production of medicines, vaccines, and health commodities, emphasizing the importance of scaling up quality manufacturing closer to consumers, and learning from the experience of countries such as China and India in managing health aid actively, carefully to build health sovereignty rather than erode it.

This sets the stage for collaboration between Chinese and African stakeholders, presenting substantial opportunities.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The African continent needs innovation in health cooperation; we need innovation in health financing; we need innovation in healthcare delivery to build a resilient and sustainable healthcare system for the future. And there is an opportunity for China to be at the centre of this, in three ways.

First, China has the opportunity to directly support Africa’s pharmaceutical sector to grow by finding ways to push more foreign direct investment into the continent. Africa is actively working on enhancing its vaccine production capabilities, with countries like Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Rwanda, and Senegal leading efforts. Private sector investment can be a crucial driver for economic growth and development, and local production capacity for African medicines, can be focused on replacing Africa’s import volumes of health commodities reaching US$21.8 billion in 2021 globally.

And China is well placed.

For instance, of the total bilateral supply of COVID19 vaccines to Africa, our data suggests that China accounted for 75% of donated doses and 61% of delivered doses to African nations. Africa also has abundant raw materials, such as palm oil, latex, and cotton, for the production of essential medical devices and health commodities. With Africa’s growing population, tailoring these to address prevalent diseases, such as malaria, HIV/AIDS, cholera, even monkeypox and other diseases less prevalent in wealthy countries, will be an excellent place to start, especially if Chinese manufacturing firms make local partnerships to bring costs down, and emphasize the importance of indigenous research and development in the pharmaceutical and medical device sectors, with a specific focus on integrating Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) and Traditional African Medicine (TAM) practices. This will advantage local medicines.

And, with more efficiency and infrastructure, especially in pharmaceutical parks which already exist and continued to be established in key hubs on the continent, it will also be plausible to position manufacturing on the continent for export to global markets, including back to China,

especially if Africa is able to negotiate for more preferential trading schemes with various countries.

Supporting Africa’s health needs by directing private sector finance to invest in local manufacturing – not just sending and distributing health products – is something we have hardly seen other donors do. It is well overdue.

Second, China can support – with grant-based aid funds – comprehensive capacity-building programs tailored to the specific needs of African nations. This can build on China’s existing collaboration with Africa’s own central health institution the Africa Center for Disease Control (Africa CDC), and can include initiatives to enhance the skills and expertise of local professionals in manufacturing, quality control, and regulatory compliance. Collaboration with the new African Medicines Agency (AMA) will help to ensure that capacity-building efforts are aligned with the latest medical practices and standards – standards that are diverse, reflect African needs at the stage of its development not just global multinationals needs for IP protection, and also reflect Africa’s own medical remedies. By helping to build a skilled local workforce in collaboration with Africa’s own medical associations, China can work to support African countries to develop a robust foundation for health sovereignty.

Again, while we have seen many partners including China send medical teams to Africa, or build hospitals, we have hardly seen partners bolster the African institutions that plan to do this, in a big way. At best, the support is ad hoc and small. Yet again, it is well overdue.

Third, and last but not least, China can support innovation in health cooperation to have an “exit strategy” by actively listening to and advocating African positions globally when it comes to health needs. For example, African Heads of State in 2022 agreed a position that all global procurement agencies such as GAVI, UNICEF and others should aim to source at least 30 per cent of all their vaccines from Africa. Similarly, African countries urgently need the WHO to be faster in approving more types or brands of the Oral Cholera Vaccine to improve global supply.

Seeking to understand and support African positions on the global health sector will be incredibly useful for China going forwards – and again, hardly practiced in international cooperation so far.

Ladies and Gentlemen, in conclusion, the road to a thriving health sector in Africa may have its challenges, but the lessons from China and other emerging economies illuminate the path forward. An exit strategy, with local manufacturing, local knowledge and African leadership at its core.

Let us embark on this vision for an exit strategy with optimism, resilience. Only through true health sovereignty everywhere will we build a brighter future for our communities and the generations to come.

Xie Xie!

December 2023

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The tripartite framework meeting underscored the importance of strengthening Africa’s healthcare system by localising the production of medicines and health commodities, a need made evident by the recent pandemic-driven shortages and supply chain disruptions. The gathering at The Grand Millennium Hotel Beijing explored innovative solutions for Africa’s healthcare sector, drawing on the combined expertise of leaders from China, Africa, and the United Nations.

Discussions focused on four strategic areas: increasing investment in production facilities, enhancing skills and knowledge, advancing research and new product development, and improving governance and oversight. The meeting also provided a platform for sharing experiences and mapping out the future of local medicine manufacturing in Africa.

Concrete targets and next steps were set, such as:

• Boosting the production of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API) in Africa,
• Transforming local raw materials into valuable pharmaceuticals,
• Supporting the African Medicines Agency (AMA), 
• Prioritising herbal medicine cooperation between China and Africa, and
• Securing funding for these initiatives.

Above all, the discussions underscored the importance of turning plans into concrete actions that lead to lasting health benefits across the continent.

59 people participated in the high-level meeting. This included 29 African embassies including 8 Ambassadors such as The Ambassador of the Republic of Senegal and Co-Chair of FOCAC (H.E. Ibrahima Sory Sylla), The Ambassador of Uganda to China (H.E. Olive Wonekha), The Ambassador of the Republic of Cabo Verde to China (H.E. Arlindo do Rosario), and more; The African Union’s Representative to China (H.E. Rahamtalla M), Deputy Director General Department of African Affairs China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Counsellor Mr. Xing Yuchun), President of China Chamber of Commerce Import and Export of Medicine (Mr. Zhou Hui), Special Envoy of African Medicines Agency (Mr. Michel Sidibe), the UN Resident Coordinator in China, (H.E. Siddharth Chatterjee), and UNICEF (Ms. Amakobe Sande) and UNAIDS Representatives (Mr. Bruce Lerner) in China.

Development Reimagined is pleased to have facilitated this tripartite framework dialogue and looks forward to collaborating with relevant stakeholders to implement the meeting’s outcomes.

For more information or follow-up, please contact the DR Africa-China Team programme manager Jing Cai at  jingcai@developmentreimagined.com

Tripartite Framework Consultation Meeting on Medicine Production in Africa Highlights

November 2023

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Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen,

Firstly, I would like to extend our heartfelt gratitude to the China Africa Business Council for extending this gracious invitation to us. Congratulations on the launch of your 2023 report, an accomplishment that marks yet another milestone in the China-Africa business ecosystem. We were deeply honored to have collaborated on the 2022 version of this report and are equally privileged to be present today for the 2023 report launch.

I am often asked the question whether I am optimistic about Africa. Every time, my strong, immediate answer is of course – yes. And my answer is backed by the statistics. This year and for the next two years, according to the IMF’s latest forecasts, overall economic growth across the African region will outpace the rest of the world, and African countries will account for 60% of the top 10 fastest-growing economies globally in 2024 and 2025.

This is all despite significant man-made and unavoidable global and regional shocks in recent years – from the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war, the war in Sudan and coups in Central and West Africa, to drought and famine in East Africa, earthquakes in North Africa, floods in China and Libya, and much more.

I am also equally optimistic about the Africa-China relationship. It has now been two years since the 8^th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation, held in Dakar, Senegal in November 2021 in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. Over this period important strides have been made. In 2022, China-Africa trade in goods reached US$282 billion, 42% of which was exports from Africa to China – exports that are more diverse than ever. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from China has almost recovered to pre-pandemic levels and shows strong signs of continued growth.

This progress has all required a great deal of proactive work by African governments and the Chinese government, but African and Chinese business have also been central to this resilience and dynamism. As one of the African members of the China Made in Africa Business Council (CABC) – a Chinese non-governmental organization that has grown significantly over the last two years to now have over 3000 Chinese members, we have been proud to not only document but also make our own contributions to growth and development on the African continent through partnership with Chinese stakeholders.

Whether it is supporting African brands to showcase their amazing “Made in Africa” products at the biennial China Africa Economic and Trade Expo and other trade fairs, working with African Financial Institutions to promote their engagement with Chinese banks, or working with Chinese businesses – often CABC members – to help them scope and make investments into African markets, Made in Africa we have seen the appetite for serious, sustained engagement go from strength to strength.

At the same time, as this report rightly demonstrates, there is a very long way to go. Unfortunately, one of the major reasons for African resilience to the global shocks has been Africa’s marginalization in the world economy on most metrics – from trade to renewable energy production to investment and external debt, Africa’s shares of these global statistics tend to hover between 2-4%. The major exceptions are Africa’s share of global mining and fossil-fuel production. And as this report carefully explains, this is no historic mistake. It is a legacy of plunder and occupation by former imperial powers.

At the same time, including with strong, African-led engagement with China, there Is hope for shifting these patterns, once and for all, and therefore making a major mark on history.

In 2014, when the African Union blueprint for development now known as “Agenda 2063” was launched, the then Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the remarkable Madame Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma wrote a letter to a fictional young man, living in 2063, whom she called Kwame. In this letter, she expressed her expectation that in 2063, Africa will be the third-largest economy in the world, a global manufacturing hub, the home of some of the world’s most prosperous multinationals.

Africa moving up value chains – to produce more “Made in Africa” end-products -Made in Africa will be the only way in which this is possible. And the movement up value chains must happen in every single sector, from producing tea bags to fashion and toys to vehicles and wind turbines on the continent. The Made in Africa Secretariat of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has identified four key sector priorities for increased cross-continental trade – Made in Africa agro-processing, automotive, pharmaceuticals, and transportation and logistics – to initiate and accelerate this process decisively.

It is a great step.

But this kind of action will only be possible if both African and Chinese businesses – Made in Africa such as those documented in this important report – from small to medium to large, also have this same vision and work together to make it happen.

Both sides can learn so much from each other. African businesses can learn about new and different business models that have worked in Chinese settings and might work in African countries. Chinese firms can learn about African market regulations and working cultures, and therefore, more easily outsource their manufacturing – both to export back to China as well as produce for local markets. African firms can learn about Chinese consumers and adapt their products accordingly. Chinese companies can do the same, and thereby more easily localize. African businesses can understand Chinese management styles and long-distance logistics planning and use these to improve efficiency, driving up productivity.

This special edition of “Chinese Investment in Africa Report 2023” makes a crucial contribution to this mutual engagement and learning.

Explaining the history, the new trends, as well as documenting the activities of Chinese firms on the African continent is not only informative, it is inspirational and motivating. No company can be perfect, no country has no imperfections. But vision, risk appetite and true entrepreneurship as well as strong government support can go a long way.

The road to African prosperity is long, but there is no doubt today that we have all started the journey. Reports like this can help us gather the energy to not only continue, but also take larger, bolder strides, overcoming all shocks we will meet along the way, remain optimistic, and in doing so make and change history.

October 2023

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China is the world’s largest beef importer, and South Africa has been exporting a decent supply of frozen, deboned beef since September 2017. In 2018, China became the largest destination for South African beef, and in 2019, South Africa became China’s sixth biggest beef import source behind South American countries and Australia. Unfortunately, however, South Africa’s high-ranking position was dislodged by two outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease in February 2019 and then again in April 2022.

Namibia was also granted permission to export its beef to China in 2019, but has only exported minimal volumes, peaking in value at US$ 11 million in 2019 and steadily declining to $US 5 million in 2022. Botswana has also entered talks to export its beef to China but has not yet been granted permission.

The resumption of South Africa’s beef exports to China will certainly give South Africa’s exports a boost and support their diversification. This is because China accounts for 9.4% of South Africa’s total exports, but they are still dominated by two categories – mineral products and iron and steel, which are both unprocessed, lower value exports. This has contributed to a significant trade surplus in favour of China worth US$ 9 billion.

However, the value of South Africa’s beef exports to China were still fairly limited compared to China’s biggest beef import source – Brazil and another top competitor, Australia. In 2019, South Africa’s beef exports to China were worth just under US$ 22 million in comparison to Brazil’s US$ 2.093 billion and Australia’s US$ 1.767 billion.

But why?

Apart from being the biggest and cheapest global beef exporter globally, a key reason why Brazil has consistently been China’s biggest beef import source is because of its dedication to the eradication and prevention of foot-and-mouth disease in its livestock. Brazil’s last outbreak was in 2004 and in 2018, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) declared Brazil free from the illness due to the vaccination of animals, border surveillance, and the creation of a countrywide laboratory network.

Australia’s advantage, in addition to never having had a major foot-and-mouth disease outbreak, comes through extensive market research. Australia has an extremely active and well-funded beef export industry. Meat & Livestock Australia (MLA), an independent company which regulates standards for meat and livestock management in Australian and international markets, has produced a 10-year strategy focusing on producers, customers, livestock, environment, markets and systems for Australia meat and livestock industry. Through research, the MLA has discovered that 75% of all Chinese consumers place an order of priority on food safety, the food’s ability to boost the body’s immune system, quality and the country of origin.

The MLA uses a range of techniques – such as rearing health grain-fed cows, eliminates the use of antibiotics or hormones, produces marbled, wagyu beef that is one of the most expensive meats in the world and flies the majority of its beef to China to retain freshness – to match these preferences in its beef production. This has given Australia’s beef a competitive edge.

South Africa also has a similar agency, the South African Meat Industry Company (SAMIC), a quality insurance company that works to ensure quality and safe meat production in South Africa. However, it is less well funded than the MLA, meaning a higher likelihood of disease outbreaks and little Chinese consumer market research conducted.

Hence, in China, South Africa’s beef is still considered relatively low quality and is primarily sold to the foodservice sector rather than served proudly in Chinese restaurants. Turning this perception around must be a priority, including through stronger disease protection efforts and better marketing in China- including targeting standards that match Chinese consumer tastes, for example prioritising rounding off cattle for 120 days.

These lessons may also be applicable to South Africa’s neighbours — Namibia and Botswana. Rather than being competitors, these three countries could work together to increase their production capacity to meet China’s demand for beef and better compete with bigger beef exporters, such as Brazil and Australia.

The good news is that South Africa has proved historically that it is capable of becoming a major beef supplier to the Chinese market and is more likely to achieve this now that Chinese and African leaders are pushing more than ever to boost Africa’s agricultural exports to China. Africa’s agricultural exports to China increased from US$ 4.5 billion in 2012 to almost US$ 8 billion in 2022 amidst support mechanisms, such as appointing Chinese plant health certification experts to work with several African countries on accelerating the alignment of trade standards for African agricultural goods entering China. Chinese companies, such as Greenchain, have been developing new practical supply chains of agricultural goods from Africa to China, for instance Kenyan avocados, to increase production and ease the import process to China and on to buyers.

On the sidelines of the BRICS, President Xi Jinping proclaimed China-South Africa relations to be entering a ‘golden-era’. No doubt this will happen. However, until there is consistent improvement to South Africa’s disease prevention methods and beef production standards that put proudly-from-South Africa-beef on the plates of Chinese consumers, the new market access rules may make little difference during this new era.

9th September, 2023

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Development Reimagined in partnership with the African Union Permanent Mission in Beijing convened an evening with Professor Deborah Brautigam, the Director of the China-Africa Research Initiative, and Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of Political Economy Emerita at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), on Friday 26 May 2023 at Development Reimagined’s Beijing office.

The event aimed to bring together African ambassadors, Prof. Deborah Brautigam, and Development Reimagined for an engaging discussion. It was envisioned as an evening dedicated to gaining valuable insights from Prof. Brautigam, a renowned expert in the field of Africa-China relations. Instead of constraining the discussion to a specific topic, it sought to provide a platform for Prof. Brautigam to present an overview of her team’s most recent work, with a particular focus on loans and financing in the Africa-China context.

Professor Brautigam delivered a presentation on the research methodology employed in her latest publication, titled “Will Africa Feed China.” During her discourse, she also recounted her past experiences of conducting research as a visiting senior research fellow at the Department of Strategy and Governance Division within the premises of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in Washington, DC. She further discussed the work that went into her previous and equally thought-provoking read: “The Dragon’s Gift: A Real Story of China in Africa,” a book that relied on nearly three decades of scholarship and field research in South Africa, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe.

Over 15 guests, including 8 Ambassadors, joined the event to share their insights and opinions during a lively Q&A session. The discussions were held under Chatham House rules, to encourage frank discussion.

The event concluded with Prof. Brautigam signing a number of books for event participants and engaging with participants.

Development Reimagined is thankful to the African Union Permanent Mission in Beijing for convening the informal gathering on Gaining Insights into Africa’s Development Trajectory, and for working with us to make it a success.

In recent years, Development Reimagined has convened a series of compelling high-level events that have brought together the African Diplomatic Corps in Beijing with key opinion leaders and experts from around the world. Distinguished figures such as Dr. Okonjo-Iweala, the Director of the World Trade Organisation (WTO); Dr. Agnes Kalibata, the President of AGRA; Ms. Bogolo Kenewendo, Africa Director of UN Climate Champions; and Faten Aggad, Senior Advisor on Climate Diplomacy and Geopolitics of the Africa Climate Foundation, among others, have graced these gatherings with their presence, and DR will continue to provide such interesting spaces for years to come.

For those who were unable to join us, we invite you to stay connected as we bring you updates on forthcoming events and opportunities for further engagement.

Want to partner with DR to host an event? For any inquiries or feedback, please do not hesitate to reach out to us at:

Miss Judith Mwai

African Diplomacy/UN Agencies Engagement Lead

judithmwai@developmentreimagined.com

For additional information about Prof. Deborah Brautigam, kindly visit:

https://www.deborahbrautigam.com/

September 2023

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On May 30, 2023, the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), supported by Development Reimagined (DR) hosted a roundtable discussion titled “Joining Hands to Realize an Africa-Led Biodiversity and Development Agenda.”

This inclusive event drew the participation of more than 15 African diplomats at the Ambassadorial level, alongside the esteemed CEO of AWF, Mr. Kaddu Sebunya, and the Senior Conservation Scientist at AWF, Dr. Nakedi Maputa, fostering an environment of collaboration and mutual understanding.

The central objective of this event was to establish a forum where diverse stakeholders could engage in meaningful conversations regarding the critical issues surrounding conservation and biodiversity in Africa. During these discussions, the assembled African diplomatic corps emphasized the significance of maintaining consistent and sustainable biodiversity efforts. Additionally, they highlighted the importance of proactive strategies to address the challenges posed by climate change adaptation and mitigation.

During a duration of three hours, the assembly observed an exchange of perspectives, as distinguished attendees posed insightful questions and collaboratively discussed remedies to the challenges under consideration. Noteworthy is the event’s objective to heighten the awareness of African Ambassadors about Africa’s conservation objectives, as delineated in the African Union’s Agenda 2063, the APAC Kigali Call to Action, and the CBD Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF).

In particular, the African Wildlife Foundation, the African Ambassadors, and Development Reimagined identified opportunities for jointly promoting collaboration between Africa and China on the implementation and realization of the CBD Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) goals and targets, and the realization of the APAC Kigali Call to Action as an articulation of Africa’s conservation priorities.

Development Reimagined is thankful to the African Wildlife Foundation for engaging Development Reimagined to help organise the roundtable dinner titled “Joining Hands to Realize an Africa-Led Biodiversity and Development Agenda”, and we look forward to further results on the ground from its success.

For any inquiries or feedback, please don’t hesitate to reach out to us at:

Miss Judith Mwai

African Diplomacy/UN Agencies Engagement Lead

judithmwai@developmentreimagined.com

August 2023

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