This first dialogue, ‘Collaboration vs Competition- How can African organisations get the most out of local partnerships?’  explored how African led and/or African-owned organisations – from think tanks to Civil Society Organisations (CSO), private sector organisations (incl. consultancies) and even banks – can work together to build on shared strengths, avoid competition and best advance decolonisation in development. Ultimately working towards ensuring fast tracked progress on the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2063 on the continent.

Most African organisations are working towards localising development and fostering African leadership, emphasising the significant potential for more impactful outcomes through collaboration. However, localisation models have been about local and grassroots organisations working in collaboration with international development agencies and donors. The agency and African ownership this creates is limited and can in turn replicate unfavourable power dynamics within the system.

One of the key messages from the dialogue was that creating strong ecosystems and building up networks can play a significant role in transforming how African organisations partner.

The dialogue outlined practical steps for local organisations to achieve collective success in their development initiatives. It also considered the crucial roles that African governments, and the private sector can play in supporting these collaborative efforts.

Download the summary report/write-up (ENGLISH) here

If you wish to engage in further conversations or be included in our mailing list clients@developmentreimagined.com Your involvement is vital as we collectively drive transformative change in the development landscape.

5^th of December 2023

The post Event: Fast-Tracking Decolonisation Dialogue Series launch Collaboration vs. Competition: How can African organisations get the most out of local partnerships? appeared first on Development Reimagined.

The UNAIDS Report revealed that:

1. Seven African countries have achieved the 95-95-95 targets – that is, 95% of people living with HIV know their status, 95% of those aware of their status receive life-saving antiretroviral treatment, and 95% of those on treatment attain suppressed viral loads. These countries are Eswatini, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Sao Tome and Principe.
2. Eight other African countries are on their way to meeting these targets.

This is remarkable progress, given that HIV/AIDS had ravaged the continent and that data showed Africa had the highest number of infections in the early 2000s; it was also the leading cause of death in Africa. Progress has also been witnessed in the: – new HIV infections that fell by 37%, HIV-related deaths fell by 45%, and 13.6 million lives were saved due to Antiretroviral therapy (ART). There has also been significant progress in ART coverage, with considerable expansion between 2012 and 2022. The transmission cases were few in 2020 for two reasons: COVID-19 restricted movement but most importantly, ART coverage has greatly improved over the years.

Despite this progress, it is not the time to lower our guard – although again, we are not sounding the alarm!

The goal is to eradicate HIV/AIDS by the year 2030 under SDG 3 but this requires financing. Data reveals that funding for HIV/AIDS was significantly reduced in 2021. Data also shows that the funding was decreased due to countries’ little fiscal space during COVID-19 as finances were redirected to other sectors and the fight against the pandemic. Now, LMIC, including Africa, need US$ 29 billion per year to meet the SGD 3 goal of eradicating HIV/AIDS by the year 2030. Notably, fully financing the fight against HIV/AIDS will lead to a reduction of infections by 40-90% per year.

Local manufacturing has played a significant role in fighting HIV/AIDS in Africa. African countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe manufacture ART drugs locally. But data reveals that local production does not meet local needs.

So, what do we propose?

While HIV/AIDS funding for access to drugs is essential, we propose that external funding be directed to local manufacturing. External funders must work hand in hand with existing local manufacturers to help them grow rather than crowd them out, to contribute to Africa’s health sovereignty journey.

Two, funding should focus on prevention, in a bid to ensure funding does not stop. Prevention includes areas such as: – maternal health, pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) and post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP). Funding prevention will drastically reduce the number of new infections.

Again, we are not sounding the alarm; we are tracking progress, but this progress is not without shortcomings. So, on this World AIDS Day – as Africa continues with its ascent in the fight against HIV/AIDS – we propose funding be directed to local manufacturing and prevention.

Check out our infographic below to understand the data yourself!

To find out how Development Reimagined can support you, your organisation, or Government, please email the team at clients@developmentreimagined.com.

Special thanks go to Ivory Kairo and Rugare Mukaganga for their work on the graphics collecting/analysing the underlying data and this accompanying article.

The data was collated primarily from a range of sources, including the abovementioned UNAIDS report and World Bank data.

If you spot any gaps or have any enquiries, please send your feedback to us at media@developmentreimagined.com, and we will aim to respond ASAP.

December 2023

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Over a third (39) of the countries that voted in favour of the resolution were African. Just 6 African countries abstained, and not a single African country voted against the resolution. However, when it came to a Canadian amendment backed by the United States and Israel to unequivocally condemn the 7 October “terrorist attacks” by Hamas, which also demanded that Hamas immediately release the hostages it took during the violent incursion into Israel, only 7 African countries voted in support of this amendment, and 23 African countries felt so strongly they voted against the amendment.

Humanitarian Truce in Gaza

The voting pattern of African countries strongly mirrors the collective continental position in the African Union statement published not long after the attacks on the 7th of October, 2023. In the statement, the AU Chairperson called for both sides to put an end to the military hostilities and return to the negotiation table to implement the principle of the two states living side-by-side.  

Indeed, the adoption of the resolution calling for a “humanitarian truce” which the African continent deeply supports, is a step in a pan-African position regarding the conflict. But a humanitarian truce doesn’t mean an end to this episode of violence, not to talk of a durable and sustainable peace. The resumption of violence has caused countries the world over, including in Africa, to reaffirm and emphasise the importance of the two-state solution. 

While there is a longstanding consensus among African nations that the two-state solution is the best approach for durable and sustainable peace between Israel and Palestine, there simply has not been any real practical initiative at the international level to implement this solution. This can be seen as the inspiration for China calling for the convening of a “more authoritative, wide-ranging and effective international peace conference” soon. 

Overall, African countries have avoided a recency bias in their view of the latest flare-up of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Even a country like Kenya, which voted in favour of both the original text and the amendment, highlighted that Hamas’ revised, supposedly moderated 2017 Charter “still harbors intentions to destroy Israel and its Jewish people.” The African Union’s understanding of the conflict also strongly acknowledges Israel’s systematic violation of the rights of Palestinians, and most importantly, it recognises the failure of the implementation of the two-state solution as a stumbling block to lasting peace between the two nations. As such, the African position is that stakeholders work with partners to take practical and diplomatic steps towards the implementation of the two-state solution. This is the African proposition for lasting peace based on the data.

To find out how Development Reimagined can support you, your organisation, or Government, please email the team at clients@developmentreimagined.com.

Special thanks go to Ovigwe Eguegu and Sena Voncujovi for their work on the graphics and for collecting/analysing the underlying data and this accompanying article.

The data was collated primarily from the United Nations Digital Library, the African Union Commission’s public statement, UN African Country Representatives’ statements from October 27, 2023, and various news articles.

We remain open to more detailed briefings and requests on this topic – both in terms of African views on the Gaza situation as well as implications for African countries of the unrest. If you spot any gaps or have any enquiries, please send your feedback to us at media@developmentreimagined.com, and we will aim to respond ASAP.

October 2023

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Reparations are meant to acknowledge and repair the causes and consequences of human violations in countries emerging from dictatorships, colonialism or racial injustice. Recently, this has extended to also include an increasing call for reparations in cases of loss and damage owing to climate change issues. The report unpacks the available financing options that have been fronted over time and used in practices such as special funds (funded through a mix of public and international funds and state public budgets but, it also makes a case for some unconsidered options for financing. The report offers a mix of cases studies such as Haiti and the High Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, Kazakhstan and the Green Climate Fund, US-Japanese Americans Reparations and the MauMau of Kenya vs the British government. In the case of the MauMau, they were successful in their reparations claim as the British government agreed to pay £19.9 million to the MauMau for human rights violations such as torture and imprisonment that occurred in the 1950s. The monies were paid using the British public budget. The report explores the viability of the existing financial options that have succeeded which include taxation, adaptation fund, green climate fund, debt swaps and individual and organisational reparations. 

In the report, the Advocacy Team and Development Reimagined used a scorecard based on 15 criteria, to rate the existing options and then suggest innovative financing mechanisms. Some of the set criteria include sustainability of both the recipient and payee, effectiveness, value and access. Financial transaction tax (FTT) scored the most at 107 meanwhile options such as multilateral agreements scored the lowest at 70 also because it scored very lowly on factors such as recipient sustainability. 

Overall, the report recommends the financing options should be inclusive – consulting the recipients but most importantly – the financing options should combine a mix of existing and proposed mechanisms for a better outcome.  

The full report is available to download in English here .

October 2023

The post Report: Financing Reparations and Loss and Damage – What are the Options?  appeared first on Development Reimagined.

The global challenges they and others have raised included reform of the UN itself, reform of the international financial architecture, and the need for climate finance – all especially to help alleviate ongoing conflicts, political crises in West Africa and Latin America, as well as continued climate change induced natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes. The overarching theme of UNGA 2023 was Rebuilding Trust and Reigniting Global Solidarity: Accelerating Action on the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals for Peace, Prosperity, Progress, and Sustainability for All. A major focus of this assembly was to make progress toward achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by the 2030 deadline. African countries continue to invest in this development agenda even as global challenges continue to impact them.

However, the African commitment to the UN was not consistent, nor necessarily matched by others.

Within Africa, the level of representation at the UN was lower in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region, likely due to recent military coups. Conversely, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region boasts the highest representation. Among African leaders who are absent from UNGA 2023, Eritrea’s head of state has not been seen at the UN podium since 2011, despite the lifting of the UN Arms embargo in 2018.

Beyond the African region, with the exception of the United States, the host country, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) were absent from this year’s assembly. On the other hand, the majority of non-permanent UNSC members did join to make their views clear.

And while 10 G21, heads of state did not come to New York, most did make their last UN speeches in either 2021 or 2022, with the exception of, Australia’s head of state who has not participated in UNGA since 2019.

Does this all imply a diminishing commitment among nations and a potential waning interest in engaging with the UN? To suggest so is to ignore African participation and prioritisation of this forum for resolving global challenges.  Based on the data, to African leaders, the UN appears to be as important as plurilateral forums such as the BRICS, G21 and even Africa+1 Summits. However, it is of course a challenge that others in the international community may not take it as seriously, because that means the African voices that do make the effort to make themselves clear may still not be heard.

September 2023

The post Infographic: Evaluating UNGA 2023: How many African Leaders attended, and why? appeared first on Development Reimagined.

The post Event: Engaging Africa in the G20 – Preparing for the African Union’s Inclusion  appeared first on Development Reimagined.

The post Infographic: Can The AU’s Inclusion in The G20 Help Rebalance Trade Relationships? appeared first on Development Reimagined.

Indeed, this 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg arrives at a crucial moment. Many countries are grappling with food inflation and trying to boost food security and sovereignty. 

CGTN reports emphasize the BRICS’ commitment to addressing endemic issues like poverty and rural development, key challenges across Asia, Africa, and South America. But how true is this? What can be said about the state of Africa’s current agricultural trade with the BRICS relative to G7 countries, and what this might imply for food security and sovereignty?

Although arguably having less historical ties to African countries, the BRICS countries, overall,  tend to import more agricultural products from the African continent as a proportion of their overall agricultural imports versus the G7. South Africa consistently leads, with roughly 18% of its agricultural imports sourced from fellow African nations. 

However, as BRICs have, to date, had a smaller economic footprint than G7 countries, their imports from African countries in absolute values have been surging over the last five years, but they still hover around half of those to the G7. In 2022, while Africa’s agricultural exports to G7 nations reached US$21.26 Billion, BRICS nations marked their peak at US$10.67 Billion. Of this, China’s imports from Africa made up 49% of total BRICs imports. 

Set against this, over the past five years, African nations have increasingly sourced agricultural imports from France, the USA, Brazil, and India. 

Amongst the BRICS and G7, only China and Canada are changing their import patterns significantly when it comes to Africa. Africa’s exports to China have nearly doubled in value between 2017-2022, while over the same period, Africa’s exports to Canada rose by 73%, nearly double the growth in other G7 countries. 

But does this matter? Significantly so. Improperly managed import dependencies can lead to food insecurity. A case in point is India’s recent export ban on non-basmati white rice in July 2023, which the data suggests has likely affected African nations more than Ukraine’s wheat did (Read Development Reimagined’s report on this here).   

That said, African nations display varied import dependencies on the G7 and the BRICS. Despite having agricultural trade deficits with G7 and BRICS countries, Africa’s imports from the two blocs have varied annually, indicating shifts in Africa’s reliance on imports. 

With BRICS, Africa has achieved an agricultural trade surplus with China between 2018 and 2022, but has faced deficits with other BRICS countries. With G7, Africa has had consistent agricultural trade deficits with France, Canada, and the USA between 2017 and 2022. But with the rest of the G7, Africa has achieved trade surpluses throughout the same period. Hence, there’s no single narrative to this tale. 

In conclusion, if BRICS and the G7 are really focused on food security and sovereignty in African countries, they will all aim to support as many African countries as possible boost local productivity, economies of scale, and value addition of agricultural goods, while gradually opening up their markets and reducing their own agricultural exports to African countries.

To find out how Development Reimagined can support you, your organisation, or Government, please email the team at clients@developmentreimagined.com.

Special thanks go to Meghna Goyal, Rugare Mukanganga, Ovigwe Eguegu, and Sena Voncujovi for their work on the graphics and collecting/analysing the underlying data and this accompanying article.

The data was collated primarily from WITS/UN Comtrade, as well as media reports. Our in-house methodology is based on an analysis of recent agricultural trade trends (both externally and regionally), import bans and restrictions, and other trends.

If you spot any gaps or have any enquiries, please send your feedback to us at team@developmentreimagined.com, and we will aim to respond asap.

August 2023

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The first important point to note is that many countries are not monitoring COVID-19 as regularly as they did before. According to WHO data, only 9 African countries still monitor covid daily. However, this does not mean COVID-19 is over.  There have been some COVID-19 outbreaks across the continent recorded in 2023. In June, the President of Uganda of contracted COVID-19; however, he continued his duties and only experienced only mild, flu-like symptoms. Morocco and Zambia recorded new cases in Africa this week. Nevertheless, this indicates that COVID-19 is becoming less of an emergency in Africa.   

Partly this is because there has been great progress made in Africa’s vaccine coverage rate – although it is still below the world average of around 67%. Now, 52% of the continent’s eligible population has been fully vaccinated, which is just under the African Union’s target of 60%, up from just over 30% in May this year.  Around half of African countries (28 countries) have fully vaccinated over 50% of their eligible population.   

There is a discrepancy, though, in which countries have been the most successful vaccinators. Most of the continent’s top vaccinators are small island states or countries with relatively small populations under 20 million people, except Tanzania, with a population of over 60 million. These small countries include Sao Tome and Principe, Mauritius, Rwanda, Botswana, Seychelles, and more.   

Only a few large African countries have met the African Union’s target of fully vaccinating at least 60% of their eligible populations: Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Morocco. But they have made good progress, and most are close to the target.   

Another indication of progress is that the majority of African countries have fully opened their borders with limited covid-related trade restrictions. Only 42% of African countries still have trade restrictions in the form of requiring PCR tests, vaccine certificates, and quarantines for entering the country. This means that African governments are moving back to pre-pandemic conditions and are less scared of the pandemic’s impact on their countries.   

So should we all breathe a big non-COVID-infected sigh of relief (excuse the pun)?   

Yes and no. Yes, for all the reasons above, but also no, because there is still fairly low domestic vaccine production on the continent. Although there is substantial regional demand for vaccines valued at over US$1 billion annually, the continent only produces 1% of its vaccine needs, accounting for 0.1% of the global supply. 87.3% of covid vaccines currently on the continent came from abroad through bilateral agreements and the COVAX facility.  

Only 5 countries in Africa currently produce covid vaccines, although 9 more intend to produce them in the near future. Most of these countries host several facilities. In 2022, there were 20 facilities producing or planning to produce covid vaccines, but this number has increased to 26 facilities in 2023.   

Based on available estimates, by 2026, this means Africa could produce over 6 billion doses of covid-19 vaccines, which would be positive both for health sovereignty as well as creating jobs and economic growth. Furthermore, these facilities are likely to produce vaccines beyond just COVID-19 vaccines. Indeed, Africa’s ambition to decrease vaccine import dependence aligns with the African Union’s objective of producing 60% of the continent’s vaccine needs by 2040.  

However, a major challenge is that these vaccines are not (yet) embedded in local or global supply chains, although there has been some progress on this. For instance, in September 2022, India’s Serum Institute, a GAVI partner, signed a deal with Aspen South Africa to manufacture and sell four Aspen-branded vaccines for Africa in an effort to utilise its near-idle COVID-19 vaccine production lines in South Africa.  

However, in 2022, African Union Heads of State and Government called for GAVI, the UN, and other significant global purchasers of vaccines for aid and other programs to commit to ensuring 30% of their vaccines purchased are locally manufactured in Africa. This still needs to happen!  

Delivering on this call, as well as regional initiatives such as the Partnership for African Vaccine Manufacturing (PAVM) which aim to coordinate regional hubs for vaccine manufacturing, will also avoid the perception or outcome that African countries have “too many” vaccine facilities.  

To understand and review the data for yourself, have a read of our graphic below.  

This data was collated and analysed from several sources, such as the Africa CDC website, the WHO Global Trends, PERC’s COVID-19 Africa Hotspot Dashboard, Clinton Global Health Initiative reports, as well as multiple government and media releases.   

Special thanks go to Sena Voncujovi, Leslie Mudimu, Rugare Mukanganga, Kofi Owusu-Koranteng, and Anuja Sankhe for their work on the graphics, collating/analysing the underlying data and the preparation of this accompanying article.    

If you spot any gaps or have any enquiries, please send your feedback to us at interns@developmentreimagined.com and we will aim to respond ASAP!   

July 2023

The post Infographic: Is COVID-19 Finally “over” in African Countries?  appeared first on Development Reimagined.

The session explored the possibility of having the AU and AU Commission as permanent members of the G20, creating a “G21.” A “G21” would enable a more diverse representation of the continent and bring further African agency and voices to the table. 

Indeed, the G20, comprising 19 countries and the European Union, represents over 80% of the global GDP and 75% of global trade. It is a critical platform for discussing economies and developing solutions to economic crises, making it the economic and financial “security council.”  

However, despite having the eighth largest economy globally, with a collective GDP of US$3.1 trillion and a population of 1.3 billion, the African region is underrepresented in the G20. The African Union (AU) has a similar institutional arrangement as Europe, including the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), but it is only invited as an observer and not a permanent member of the G20. This is despite the continent’s significant economic and financial implications for the G20 countries and vice versa. Overall, the G20’s decisions have a major impact on Africa.  

There have been recent shifts to extend the G20 to the AU. To date, 14 of the G20 members have shown explicit support for the AU’s inclusion – with 6 countries remaining: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Italy, Mexico and Russia.  

The session explored several key themes including: 

• The importance of African representation in multilateral fora cannot be underestimated – and the shift towards Africa having a common voice and message can be seen through different key moments, 
• Africa is part of the global solutions to global challenges. The continent is home to the world’s youngest population, with growing economic capabilities. Given that the G20 is a pacesetter table – the world cannot afford to exclude Africa from these discussions, 
• There is a need to continue to scale up solid coordination within the continent to enable positive multilateral change to work for African countries, 

• Questions remain around the modalities for AU engagement within the G21. The AU is a different body to the EU, and will need to function in a different way, given that the AU has a rotating chair. How to empower the mandate and capacity of AU engagement is a crucial area to explore in preparation for the AU joining the G20. 

Speakers included: 

• H.E Mr Albert Muchanga – Commissioner for Trade and Industry of the African Union Commission, African Union Commission. 
• Dr Hanan Morsy – Deputy Executive Secretary and Chief Economist of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). 
• Ms Faten Aggad – Senior Advisor on Climate Diplomacy at the African Climate Foundation (ACF). 

• Ms Mavis Owusu-Gyamfi – the Executive Vice President of the African Center for Economic Transformation (ACET). 
• Ms Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, Chief Executive of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). 
• Ms Ivory Kairo, Policy Analyst and Communications Lead at Development Reimagined. 

To support understanding of the opportunities and challenges of the G21, Development Reimagined released an in-depth policy brief tackling these questions, available in English, Spanish and Arabic. 

We would like to thank Development Reimagined team members – Jade Scarfe, Ivory Kairo, Christy Un, Huiyi Chen and Ovigwe Eguegu – for their work on the policy brief and the event, as well as the African Climate Foundation for their support during the Financing Summit. 

June 2023

The post Event: From Paris to Delhi: The Demand for a New Financial Architecture – Why the G20 Needs the African Union appeared first on Development Reimagined.